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Vehicle Secrecy Parameters for
V2V Communications
Na-Young Ahn and Dong Hoon Lee
Abstract
This paper studies the parameters affecting secrecy capacity in vehicle commu-
nication. The vehicle secrecy parameters largely include vehicle driving-related
parameters, antenna-related parameters for transmitting and receiving signals,
path-related parameters for indirect communication, and noise-related parameters
using a fading channel. Although many researches have been conducted on
antenna-related parameters and noise-related parameters considered in general
wireless communication, relatively little research has been made on parameters
caused by the vehicle itself. These vehicle secrecy parameters also imply that
secrecy capacity can be varied by the user. In the future, this study will be a very
informative topic when trying to perform vehicle communication while
maintaining a certain level of security capacity. In the coming autonomous driving
era, this research is very necessary and will help to carry out vehicle communica-
tions more safely.
Keywords: secrecy capacity, vehicle secrecy parameter, physical layer security,
vehicle speed, antenna, relay, fading
1. Introduction
Vehicle-to-vehicle communication functionality is essential for general 5G com-
munications [1, 2]. This functionality aims to achieve the safe operation of autono-
mous vehicles by sharing vehicle driving-related information, such as basic security
messages (BSMs). To guarantee vehicle-to-vehicle functionality, security must be
the foundation of design and privacy must be a priority. Previous studies have
already made significant progress on security beyond the vehicular network layer
[3, 4]. Yet, despite this, existing vehicle security schemes demonstrate insufficient
computing power and large power consumption with respect to processing received
or transmitted data from a large number of vehicles. To overcome these difficulties,
researches on physical layer security [5–7] have attempted to develop secure data
communication methods based on the physical properties of the wireless channel.
In information theory, channel (or Shannon) capacity is known as a maximal
amount of information that can be transmitted through a wireless channel [8, 9]. In
general, channel capacity is given as
C ¼ Wlog 1þ SNRð Þ, (1)
where W is the channel bandwidth, and SNR is the signal-to-noise ratio. Secrecy
capacity denotes the channel capacity of a legitimate channel less the channel
1
capacity of a wiretap channel. That is, secrecy capacity is a maximum data rate that
is achievable between the legitimate TX-RX pair, subject to the constraints on
information attainable by an unauthorized receiver [10]. For a Gaussian wiretap
channel, secrecy capacity Cs is:
Cs ¼ 1
2
log 1þ P
Nm
 
 1
2
log 1þ P
Nw
 
, (2)
where P is the transmitter’s power, Nm is the receiver’s noise, and Nw is the
eavesdropper’s noise.
Secrecy capacity means an entropy that can conceptually transmit secrets
securely without taps. It is a value obtained by subtracting the channel capacity for
performing illegal communication from the channel capacity for performing math-
ematically legitimate communications? In information theory, channel capacity is
the maximum rate that can be transmitted without error. Thus, the unit of secrecy
capacity is bits/sec/Hz. Could this concept be meaningful in vehicle communica-
tion? We are asking questions, and so on. Nobody knows the existence of
wiretapping. In vehicle communication, valid data are transmitted over the air in
four directions, and anyone can obtain it if desired. Even if it is encrypted, the
existence of a quantum computer makes it possible for this threat to cause serious
problems. We naturally cannot but consider wireless channels, but protected chan-
nels, in vehicular communications. So how can we protect wireless channels, but
secure channels from eavesdroppers? The answer is physical layer security. There-
fore, research on modeling for vehicle communications is inevitable.
Secrecy capacity can be controlled in real time. The parameters affecting these
security capacities are classified as follows: vehicle-related parameters, antenna-
related parameters, communication path-related parameters, and noise-related
parameters.
2. Vehicle-related parameters
Vehicle-related parameters are very important for vehicle accidents and physical
safety as parameters related to the operation of the vehicle while driving. The
vehicle-related parameters include speed of the autonomous vehicle, the response
time, etc., as mentioned by Ahn et al. [11].
2.1 Vehicle speed
It is generally assumed that secrecy capacity will be increased according to the
vehicle speed. For example, it is assumed that there will be a difference in
eavesdropping data transmitted from a vehicle running at low speeds and
eavesdropping data transmitted from vehicles running at high speeds. Considering
the Doppler effect, there is a theoretical study on this [12]. Chopra et al. suggested
that as the vehicle speed increases, the eavesdropper is less likely to succeed in
eavesdropping [12].
Chopra has announced that as speed of the vehicle increases, the probability of
an attacker’s success gradually decreases, referring to Figure 1. A common guess is
that you will get your hands on these results. SNR value for speed is drastically
reduced according to the effects of beam merge and Doppler shift, and the proba-
bility of success of the eavesdropper is expected to sharply decrease (Figure 1).
However, this is related to naive wireless communication, and it is difficult to
apply it to a vehicle in operation. As mentioned in the previous section, the
2
Intelligent System and Computing
autonomous vehicle speed is closely related to the safety distance, and the safety
distance eventually affects the channel capacity between vehicles. According to my
modeling and simulation results, as the vehicle speed increases, secrecy capacity
becomes rather small.
Ahn et al. concluded that vehicle speed is closely related to the safety distance to
prevent impulsiveness, and this safety distance ultimately affects secrecy capacity,
resulting in a close relationship between vehicle speed and secrecy capacity, refer-
ring to Figure 2. The result was, surprisingly, that the faster the vehicle speed was,
the less secrecy capacity was increased, rather than increasing (Figure 2) [11].
Some say that secrecy capacity will increase with speed of the vehicle, and others
say that secrecy capacity will be reduced depending on speed of the vehicle. Who is
wrong and who is right? I think that these results are derived from the fact that the
definition of secrecy capacity for vehicles has not been established. In addition, it is
presumed that there is a totally different answer depending on the setting, whether
or not the eavesdropper is present, whether the eavesdropper is moving, and the
information of the eavesdropper. It means that this lack of research on secrecy
capacity in vehicle communication.
So, what information do these facts give us? The relationship between vehicle
speed and secrecy capacity is simply not defined. Nevertheless, there is a connec-
tion between speed of the vehicle and secrecy capacity. The important thing is that
you can control secrecy capacity at the speed of the vehicle.
Figure 1.
Percentage of miss/success rate of attack for eavesdroppers according to different velocities of user [12].
Figure 2.
The relationship of secrecy capacity according to speed of vehicle [11].
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2.2 Vehicle system parameter
What do the system parameters of the car mean? System parameters are an
important factor in determining the collision distance between vehicles. For exam-
ple, response time has a significant impact on break distance. The break distance is
proportional to the safety distance. The response time will eventually affect the
safety distance, and this safety distance will eventually affect secrecy capacity.
The faster the response time from one vehicle to the reception and processing of
signals from other vehicles, the sooner it is expected to help secure safety. If you
think about it, it would be better to respond quickly to ensure safety. In fact, in my
simulation results, it was confirmed that the shorter the response time, the greater
secrecy capacity. However, this cannot be the correct answer in a real environment.
Why? What is the purpose of using secure capacity? Its purpose is to ensure the
safety of communication from any eavesdropper.
In order to secure the communication, the encryption method is basically used
in vehicle communication. There is a difference between the response time using an
encryption scheme and the response time without an encryption scheme. For secu-
rity, encryption will be used, and if encryption is used, response time will naturally
be longer. This long response time will eventually lead to a reduction in secrecy
capacity.
To summarize, in order to achieve security based on physical layer security, a
short response time is advantageous. On the other hand, to achieve application layer
security, response time is inevitably long. The trade-off between physical layer
security and application security is inevitable.
In any case, it is important to note that secrecy capacity is closely related to the
response time of the system. In addition, it is generally possible to select the rele-
vant mode whether or not to apply application security in the vehicle system. This
means that the response time associated with secrecy capacity is not fixed but
selectable by the user. The conclusion is that secrecy capacity is controllable
according to the selected response time.
2.3 Speed limit
Does the law govern secrecy capacity? That is right. All vehicles that drive on the
road must be moving in compliance with speed limit. I have conceptually presented
and calculated secrecy capacity of a rolling car at the intersection. The conclusion
was not beyond the expected range. It has been confirmed that as speed limit
increases, secrecy capacity decreases. If you comply with vehicle regulations, your
secrecy capacity will remain constant. In the real world, however, there is no
vehicle that keeps the law. Are these only vehicle-related parameters?
3. Antenna-related parameters
Antenna beam radiation technology has been studied variously for physical layer
security in wireless communication. Examples include transmission power alloca-
tion, artificial noise generation, jamming, and beam direction determination.
3.1 Transmission power
According to my confirmation, secrecy capacity changes according to the trans-
mission power. For example, it has been confirmed that secrecy capacity is
increased so that the transmission power can be increased. Then, in order to vary
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secrecy capacity, it is necessary to check whether the intensity of the transmission
power can be controlled in real time. However, there have been many researches on
adaptive transmission power control in view of power consumption [13, 14]. The
study of the majority of adaptive transmit power control aims at minimizing power
consumption and storing energy. It is known that transmission power control is
possible although the purpose is different. This means that secrecy capacity can be
controlled in real time through transmission power control.
3.2 Beamforming
Beamforming technology is a very old technology of physical layer security. By
forming a beam to be transmitted to the target device, the attack opportunity itself
is deprived of an attacker having malicious purpose in the other direction. Recently,
a technique for maximizing secrecy capacity using beamforming has been disclosed
[15]. 3D beamforming technology is introduced beyond 2D to increase secrecy
capacity [16, 17].
3.3 Artificial noise/jamming
A method for increasing secrecy capacity using artificial noise or jamming is
disclosed [18, 19]. The jamming strategy is to send an artificial noise signal to the
eavesdropper to effectively reduce their channel quality from correct reception. If
an artificial noise signal is aimed at an eavesdropper, the quality of the eavesdrop-
per’s channel may be degraded. According to the eavesdropping channel model, a
complete secret can be achieved if the eavesdropper’s channel state is worse than a
certain level, i.e., the legitimate receiver’s channel state. Thus, radio interference
can be a practical physical layer-based security measure, especially if the transmit-
ted information needs to be protected from unintentional manual eavesdroppers.
3.4 Antenna gain
The size and shape of the small antenna will change the effective area of the
antenna and the power output of the receiver antenna will be changed to affect
SNRs. To obtain an antenna gain G, a relatively small antenna is needed at high
frequencies [20, 21],
G ¼ 4πAe
λ2
¼ 4π f
2Ae
C2
, (3)
where Ae is the effective area, f is the carrier frequency, C is the speed of light,
and λ is the carrier wavelength. As can be seen from the equation, if the effective
area of the receiving antenna is increased, SNR value can be improved. Increasing
the carrier frequency of the transmitter can improve SNR value.
3.5 Array antenna
The array antenna disperses the incident laser beam into the respective antenna
elements through a plurality of directional couplers, modulates the phase or fre-
quency of the dispersed laser beam, and adjusts the traveling direction of the output
laser beam [22]. In general, the array antenna can vary the elevation angle and the
azimuth angle of the beam. What this means is that the host vehicle can concentrate
and transmit the beam to a specific target vehicle [23, 24]. Naturally, secrecy
capacity can be improved as compared with not. In order to keep secrecy capacity
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of the vehicle above a certain value, this characteristic of the array antenna can be
used. For example, when secrecy capacity of the vehicle is below a certain value,
secrecy capacity can be increased by controlling the phase/frequency of the array
antenna.
Referring to Figure 3, the array antenna includes a transmitter Tx having a
snake feed line structure composed of a plurality of antennas and a receiver Rx
having a structure of a plurality of lines composed of a plurality of antennas. Each
antenna of Tx and Rx may be implemented in a microstrip structure.
4. Path-related parameters
4.1 Relay communication
As described above, secrecy capacity decreases as the vehicle speed increases.
Decreased secrecy capacity as the vehicle speed increases can be compensated by a
cooperative relay communication. In V2V communication, secrecy capacity can be
improved by adoption at one relay R between the host vehicle A and the target
vehicle B. In a general, secrecy capacity of a cooperative relay communication is
higher than that of the direct communication without a relay [25–28]. For simplicity
of the analysis of secrecy capacity, we assume that the system model comprises one
relay R between the host vehicle A and the target vehicle B, as shown in Figure 4.
Channel capacity of the legitimated channel is expressed as:
C1 A, Bð Þ ¼ Wlog 2 1þ
PAhAB
PRhRB þ σ2B
  
, (4)
where PA and PR are the transmission powers of the host vehicle A and the relay
R, respectively; hAB is the channel gain between the host vehicle A and the target
vehicle B; hRB is the channel gain between the relay R and the target vehicle B; σ
2
B is
an additive white Gaussian noise at the target vehicle B; and W is a bandwidth.
Figure 3.
Array antenna for vehicles.
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And channel capacity of the wiretap channel is given by:
C2 A, Eð Þ ¼ Wlog 2 1þ
PAhAE
PRhRE þ σ2E
  
, (5)
where hAE is the channel gain between vehicle A and eavesdropper E, and σ
2
E is
the additive white Gaussian noise at vehicle B. Then, secrecy capacity with the
cooperative relay communication is denoted by
CR ¼ W log 2 1þ
PAhAB
PRhRB þ σ2B
  
 log 2 1þ
PAhAE
PRhRE þ σ2E
   
: (6)
Figure 5 shows secrecy capacity with and without the relay R. Referring to
Figure 5, we can see that the relay R helps to improve secrecy capacity in total.
We confirmed that V2V communication using the relay may enhance secrecy
capacity. The relationship between the existence of the relay and secrecy capacity
can be summarized as shown in the following table, Table 1.
As described above, when relay communication is performed, an improvement
in secrecy capacity is basically expected as compared with the case where relay
communication is not performed. For this reason, relay communication is basically
installed in vehicle communication. However, relay communication still has the
issue of relay selection and communication rejection of relay object. The important
Figure 4.
System model with a relay between vehicle A and vehicle B.
Figure 5.
Secrecy capacity variance according to relay existence [11].
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thing is that the choice of relay communication can be a factor enough to be a
variable factor of secrecy capacity.
4.2 RSU-assisted communication
When direct communication is not possible, Road Side Unit (RSU) can be used
for vehicle communication [29–31]. RSU can be used to deliver a message from one
vehicle to another. Here, the other vehicle may be an unspecified number, usually
according to the broadcast message. Therefore, since the target vehicle cannot be
specified, it is logically difficult to define secrecy capacity. At the same time,
however, the presence of eavesdroppers is also unspecific, so secrecy capacity is
expected to increase. When direct vehicle communication is not possible, indirect
vehicle communication via RSU can be achieved. For example, when serious defects
in secrecy capacity are found or expected, indirect vehicle communication via RSU
may be required. When secrecy capacity control is not possible, that is, vehicle
communication using RSU can be used last.
5. Noise-related parameters
Will noise-related parameters affect secrecy capacity? According to the concept
of secrecy capacity, noise is of course a big influence. However, the problem is
whether such noise is controllable in communication. Although it is a technology
related to noise removal in other fields, wavelet transform is used to reduce power
analysis attacks by removing noise [32–34]. Preventing DPA through wavelet
transform is basically data modulation to ensure the randomness of transmitted
data. However, the concern of noise related to secrecy capacity is not data modula-
tion, but an issue related to the environment of the channel being transmitted. Is
there a technique to eliminate or reduce channel noise, even if there is a technique
to increase the noise of the channel? Although there is a technique of relatively
increasing or decreasing the size of a signal, there is no technique for reducing or
eliminating the absolute amount of noise.
However, it cannot be said that at some point the noise of the channel becomes
the noise of the channel at another point. This suggests that the channel noise at
another point in time may be changed depending on the channel noise at a certain
point in time. Recently, research has been introduced to improve the characteristics
of a wireless signal by reducing channel noise using adaptive equalization/filter
algorithms [35, 36].
5.1 Additive white Gaussian noise channel
The channels used in communication are classified into various channels
according to the noise component existing in the medium in which the signal is
moving, not the medium itself. There are a lot of kinds of noise in the air, and
because these noises occur at all frequencies, this noise is called white noise.
The visible light, which is a type of electromagnetic wave with high frequency, has
Relay Off Down Secrecy capacity
On Up
Table 1.
Relationship between the relay mode and secrecy capacity [11].
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a different color depending on the frequency, but it is attached as if noise of various
frequencies is gathered like a white color when a plurality of colored light is
overlapped.
Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel is the most common type of
channel, and is a channel that produces even noise across the entire frequency band.
AWGN is a random noise without any special peripheral elements. This channel
only contains the sum of the white noise. Here white noise follows Gaussian density.
The corresponding probability density function p(x) is expressed by the following
equation [37, 38]:
p xð Þ ¼ 1
σ
ffiffiffiffiffi
2π
p exp x μð Þ
2
2σ2
 !
, (7)
where μ is the mean, σ is the standard deviation, and σ2 is the variance.
5.2 Rician fading channel
In a wireless channel environment, when the direct wave (line-of-sight) mainly
appears in an environment such as a room dominated by a reflected wave, the
probability distribution characteristic of the radio reception signal shows a Rician
distribution [39, 40]. Rician probability density function p(x) is expressed by the
following equation:
p xð Þ ¼ x
σ2
exp  x
2 þ Að Þ2
2σ2
 !
I0
Ax
σ2
 
, A≥0, (8)
where σ2 is the variance of the received total reflected power, that is, the
multipath signal, A is the magnitude of line of sight (LOS) or dominant component,
and Io is the zero-order transformed Bessel function.
5.3 Rayleigh fading channel
Rayleigh distribution is a stochastic model that shows the statistical time-varying
characteristics of the envelope of random amplitudes of the received signal by
independent quadrature components (such as in-phase and quadrature) or multiple
multipath signals when the indirect wave (reflected wave, etc.) predominates over
the direct channel in the wireless channel environment [41–43].
Rician factor K is dominant for multipath power (σ2), and the ratio of the minute
power (A2/2) is represented by K = A2/2σ2. When K = 0, the Rician distribution is a
Rayleigh distribution. Rayleigh probability density function p(x) is expressed by the
following equation:
p xð Þ ¼ x
σ2
exp  x
2
2σ2
 
I0
Ax
σ2
 
, A≥0: (9)
5.4 Nakagami fading channel
The multipath fading phenomenon of signals in wireless mobile communication
is a very important problem. In modeling such a fading channel, a Nakagami fading
model is known to be fit and theoretically suitable. The Nakagami fading model has
the following probability density function for the envelope of the signal [44–47]:
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p xð Þ ¼ 2m
mx2m1
Г mð ÞΩm exp 
mx2
Ω
 
, x≥0, (10)
where x is the size of the Nakagami fading signal, Ω is the mean square value of
x, Г(m) is the gamma function, and m is the rate of the modality, which determines
the shape of the distribution and is a fading index that indicates the degree of
fading. When m = 1, Rayleigh distribution is obtained. When m = 0.5, Gaussian
distribution is gained.
Generally, selective diversity is used to reduce the influence of fading. The
selection diversity is a method of selecting the largest signal among the signals
received through the multipath. If the signal received at the k-th receiving end is the
largest, the received signal can be represented by a sinusoidal wave:
yk tð Þ ¼ uk exp j2π f0tð Þ, (11)
where uk is the magnitude of the k-th received signal envelope and f0 is the
carrier frequency. Therefore, the average power of the received signal is uk
2/2.
Assuming that the average noise power is N, the SNR value of the signal received at
the k-th receiving end is as follows.
γk ¼
u2k
2N
, (12)
Therefore, the probability density function for SNR of the k-th receiver
experiencing Nakagami fading is expressed by the following equation.
pγ γð Þ ¼
mmkk γ
mk1
k
Г mkð Þγmk0
exp mkγk
γ0
 
, γ≥0, (13)
where γk is the SNR value of the k-th receiver, γ0 is the average SNR value in the
presence of fading, and mk is the SNR value of the k-th receiver. The probability
distribution function is the integral of the probability density function:
pγ γð Þ ¼
ðγ
0
mmkk γ
mk1
k
Г mkð Þγmk0
exp mkγk
γ0
  !
dx, γ≥0, (14)
Assuming that all receivers are independent of each other, the probability that
SNR value of the signal received after the selective combining is less than x is
expressed by the following equation:
Pr γsc ≤ xð Þ ¼
YD
k¼1
Pr γk ≤ xð Þ, (15)
where γsc is the SNR value after selective combining and D is the number of
receivers. Assuming that the average SNR value and the fading parameter mk are the
same at each receiving end, the SNR value of the received signal has the same proba-
bility distribution. Therefore, the SNR value of the signal received is expressed by:
Pγ,sc xð Þ ¼ Pr γk ≤ xð Þ½ D ¼ Pr xð Þ½ D, (16)
As a result, the probability density function for SNR of the received signal after
selective combining is expressed by the following equation as a differential value
of Eq. (16):
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Pγ,sc γð Þ ¼ D Pγ γð Þ
 D1
Pγ γð Þ: (17)
If the number of antennas of the receiver is larger than that of the transmitter,
the signal with the highest SNR among the signals of the multipath can be used or
the signal can be combined. If the number of antennas of the transmitter is larger
than that of the receiver, beamforming can increase the SNR value obtained by the
receiver. The number of antennas D of the receiving end may affect the SNR value.
6. Conclusions
We studied vehicle-related parameters that affect secrecy capacity of vehicle
communication, such as vehicle speed, response time, and speed limit. When con-
sidering the Doppler effect according to the speed of the vehicle, secrecy capacity is
studied to be proportional to the speed, but when considering the safety distance of
autonomous driving, secrecy capacity is inversely proportional to the speed of the
vehicle. In general, the relationship between secrecy capacity according to the
antenna-related parameters, beamforming, jamming, the size of the antenna, and
the number of antennas was also discussed. We also looked at increasing secrecy
capacity in indirect communication through relays rather than direct communica-
tion, and improving security through assistive devices. Finally, we examined how
the noise-related parameters according to the fading model influence secrecy
capacity. In conclusion, it was confirmed that various vehicle secrecy parameters
exist in vehicle communication, and these parameters can be changed by a user.
This makes it possible for us to be able to communicate with the vehicle later, while
maintaining a certain level of security. It is expected that the road to secure the
security of the vehicle radio channel used for these vehicle secrecy parameters will
begin not long.
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